

Message Text

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ACTION AF-08

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4806

AMEMBASSY MAPUTO NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY GABORONE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

AMEMBASSY MASERU

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 LUSAKA 0116

NAIROBI AND MAPUTO FOR EDMONDSON

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, RH, ZA

SUBJ: ZAMBIAN ANALYSIS OF RHODESIAN NEGOTIATIONS

SUMMARY: GOVERNMENT-OWNED DAILY MAIL CARRIED AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHODESIA NEOGTATIONS WHICH WE BELIEVE WAS GRZ INSPIRED. THE ARTICLE REALISTICALLY ANALYZES WHAT RICHARD WILL HAVE TO OFFER VORSTER TO GET HIM TO BRING FURTHER PRESSURE ON SMITH, EXPRESSES DOUBT THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL CONCEDE THIS TO RICHARD, AND WARNS SMITH THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE AN EARLY REFERENDUM (WHICH MUZOREWA WOULD WIN) WILL LEAD THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO INCITE BLOODSHED AND CIVIL STRIFE IN RHODESIA. WE BELIEVE THE ARTICLE GIVES AN INDICATION OF ZAMBIA'S COMMITMENT TO THE
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FRONTLINE SELECTION OF A SINGLE NATIONALIST GROUP AROUND WHICH ALL OF AFRICA CAN UNITE TO LEAD AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE. END SUMMARY.

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1. VORSTER RECEPTIVE TO KISSINGER PROPOSALS: ARTICLE CLAIMS THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER WAS "ASTOUNDED" BY

VORSTER'S POSITIVE REACTION TO RHODESIAN PROPOSAL OF LAST YEAR. VORSTER SAW THE PROPOSAL AS THE ONLY CHANCE HE HAD TO EXTRICATE SOUTH AFRICA FROM HIS PACT WITH SMITH. HE BELIEVED THE PROPOSAL WOULD LEAD TO THE CREATION OF A MODERATE BLACK GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA WHICH SOUTH AFRICA COULD NOT OPENLY SUPPORT BUT WHICH HE HOPED WOULD NOT GIVE PROBLEMS TO SOUTH AFRICA.

2. VORSTER PRESSURES RHODESIA: VORSTER AGREED TO AND DID APPLY PRESSURE ON SMITH TO AGREE TO MAJORITY RULE. HE USED "SUCH STRONG ARMED TACTICS AS WITHHOLDING RHODESIAN GOODS FOR A FEW DAYS TO SHOW SMITH THE PRICE HE WOULD PAY FOR HIS INTRANSIGENCE IF SOUTH AFRICA REALLY MEANT TO APPLY SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA." UNDER PRESSURE, SMITH GRUDGINGLY ACCEPTED BLACK MAJORITY RULE WITHIN TWO YEARS AS INEVITABLE. HE THEN MADE HIS SEPT 24 SPEECH.

3. AMBIGUITY OF KISSINGER PROPOSAL: THE KISSINGER PROPOSALS "MEANT MANY THINGS TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE." NATIONALISTS SAW SERIOUS FLAWS IN THEM AND WANT THEM RENEGOTIATED. FRONTLINE STATES SAW FLAWS ALSO AND "EVEN REFUSED THAT THEY HAD ACCEPTED THEM IN THEIR RAW FORM." SMITH NOW SAYS THAT IF RICHARD DEPARTS FROM THE KISSINGER PROPOSALS HE WILL HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THEM.

4. VORSTER'S PRESENT STAND: VORSTER HAS NEITHER REJECTED NOR SUPPORTED THE NEW BRITISH PROPOSALS. HE TOLD RICHARD TO GO AHEAD AND SELL THEM TO SMITH, THE NATIONALISTS, AND THE FRONTLINE COUNTRIES. AFTER THAT HE WOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL

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READY TO OFFER COMMENT ON THE PROPOSALS.

5. RICHARD IN THE MIDDLE: IN DEALING WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT RICHARD HAS TO WORRY ABOUT WHETHER POSITIONS TAKEN BY THE FRONT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO VORSTER. FOR WITHOUT VORSTER'S LEANING ON SMITH, HE CAN BE "EXPECTED TO PLAY MORE GAMES WITH THE BRITISH." RICHARD CAN TAKE SOME CONSOLATION FROM THE FACT THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAS COMMITTED SMITH TO MAJORITY RULE WITHIN TWO YEARS. VORSTER CAN BE "EXPECTED TO REMIND SMITH THAT IF HE DOES NOT PLAY BALL, BIG BROTHER WILL HAVE NO OBLIGATION TO SALVAGE HIS SINKING SHIP." NKOMO AND MUGABE ARE TAKING AN UNCOMPROMISING LINE AND THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO DO SO. THEY ARE FORCED INTO THIS BY THE SLIPPERINESS OF SMITH. "IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERSHIP COULD ONLY TRUST SMITH FOR A FEW MINUTES, THEY WOULD EASILY BE PERSUADED TO TAKE POLITICAL RISKS."

6. PATRIOTIC FRONT FEARFUL OF BRITISH PROPOSALS: "IT IS

BECAUSE OF THE INHERENT DISTRUST THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAS OF SMITH THAT WILL MAKE MR. NKOMO AND MR. MUGABE THINK TWICE ABOUT GIVING TOO MUCH POWER TO THE BRITISH RESIDENT COMMISSIONER IN SALISBURY, MAKE THEM DECIDE AGAINST A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CONSISTING OF THE LEADERS OF THE FIVE DELEGATIONS TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE TO WORK WITH THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER AS ITS CHAIRMAN, AND MAKE THEM DECIDE AGAINST THE COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES IN RHODESIA TO BE REPLACED BY THE BRITISH ONE WITH THEIR OWN FORCES IN THE BACKGROUND AND MANY OTHER SENSITIVE ISSUES." IF THE NEGOTIATIONS EXCLUDED SMITH, THE WORK OF THE BRITISH WOULD BE MADE EASIER. HOWEVER, NATIONALISTS WILL NOT PUT THEIR SIGNATURES TO ANYTHING WHICH IS NOT FIRM, SUCH AS AN AGREEMENT WHICH COULD BE NULLIFIED BY SMITH.

7. IMPLICATION OF A REFERENDUM IN RHODESIA: BISHOP MUZOREWA IS CALLING FOR A REFERENDUM TO DETERMINE WHO
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ENJOYS THE SUPPORT OF THE AFRICAN PEOPLE. SMITH HAS TO GO ALONG WITH THE IDEA, BUT HE RECOGNIZES THAT IF IN FACT A REFERENDUM IS ORGANIZED IT WILL END THE DIVISIONS AMONG THE NATIONALISTS. HE WILL, THEREFORE, BE RELUCTANT TO PERMIT A REFERENDUM. BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS TEMPORARILY MADE POLITICAL GAINS OVER THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. HOWEVER, SMITH "MORE THAN THE BISHOP VERY WELL KNOWS THAT THE QUICKEST WAY OF BRINGING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO POWER IS BY ORGANIZING A REFERENDUM. SMITH KNOWS MORE THAN THE BISHOP THAT THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES CANNOT GIVE PROTECTION TO ANYBODY INCLUDING THE BISHOP HIMSELF DURING THE CONFUSION OF A REFERENDUM WHILE THERE IS A WAR ON. SMITH MORE THAN THE BISHOP KNOWS THAT IF ANYBODY IN RHODESIA DARES ORGANIZE A REFERENDUM, THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS WOULD MAKE SURE THE

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FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

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REFERENDUM WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE AND THE WAR WOULD MOVE FROM THE BUSH TO HARARE AND HIGHFIELDS WITH CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. SMITH KNOWS BETTER THAN THE BISHOP THAT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS IT WILL BE MEN WITH THE GUNS WHO DICTATE INDEPENDENCE TERMS AND NOT THOSE WHO MUST DEPEND ON SMITH FOR BOTH PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND POLITICAL SURVIVAL."

8. PATRIOTIC FRONT A CERTAIN WINNER: PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL DICTATE THE TERMS OF INDEPENDENCE BECAUSE IT HAS THE FIRE POWER AND LEADERSHIP COMMITTED TO TRUE INDEPENDENCE. FURTHER THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IS NOT GOVERNED BY TRIVIAL CONSIDERATIONS AS IS THE ANC, WHICH WOULD COLLAPSE INTO NOTHINGNESS IF TRIBALISM WHICH SUSTAINS IT WERE REMOVED. END UNCLASSIFIED

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COMMENT: THE ARTICLE IS REMARKABLE IN A NUMBER OF WAYS-- FOR ITS REALISTIC ANALYSIS OF WHAT RICHARD WILL NEED TO SELL HIS PLAN TO VORSTER -- FOR ITS HARD-HEADED PROJECTION OF THE PROBABLE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE PF TO GIVE RICHARD WHAT HE NEEDS BECAUSE OF ITS PROFOUND DISTRUST FOR SMITH -- AND FOR THE FRANKNESS OF ITS NEGATIVE WARNING TO SMITH THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO STAGE AN EARLY REFERENDUM WHICH WOULD INSTALL MUZOREWA WOULD INVITE BLOODSHED AND CIVIL STRIFE, ALL LED BY THE PF.

IF THE ARTICLE IS AS AUTHORITATIVE AS WE SUSPECT, IT IS FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE FRONTLINE OR AT LEAST THE ZAMBIAN PART OF IT IS FULLY COMMITTED TO THE PF AS THE ORGANIZATION WHICH IT HAS ANNOINTED AND CAN RALLY AROUND AS THE LEADER OF THE NATIONALISTS IN ZIMBABWE. WHETHER THE PF IS THE STRONGEST AND THE MOST EFFECTIVE NATIONALIST ORGANIZATION OR WHETHER IT COMMANDS THE GREATEST SUPPORT IN ZIMBABWE ARE LESS IMPORTANT

THAN THE FACT THAT IT IS THE ONE ORGANIZATION BEHIND WHICH
THE FRONTLINE STATES AND AFRICAN INDEPENDENT NATIONS CAN UNITE,
THUS SPARING THEMSELVES THE HUMILIATION OF THE DIVISIONS OF
THE ANGOLA WAR.

ZAMBIA LEADERS CONSTANTLY REFER TO THE MOZAMBIQUE
EXPERIENCE AS A MODEL. A RESOLUTION OF THE INDEPENDENT
STRUGGLE THERE WAS NEGOTIATED IN LUSAKA AND THE ZAMBIANS
BACKED THE IMPOSITION OF FRELIMO ON MOZAMBIQUE, WHETHER
THEY WANTED IT OR NOT.

THE ONLY DIFFICULTY IS THAT THE SITUATIONS ARE
DIFFERENT. A WEAK PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT DETERMINED TO WITHDRAW
FROM MOZAMBIQUE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE IS A VERY DIFFERENT
ANTAGONIST FROM A STUBBORN SMITH RECENTLY HEARTENED BY THE
EASE OF HIS MILITARY VICTORIES AGAINST ZIPA AND ITS SUPPORTING
MOZAMBIQUE FORCES AND BY WHAT APPEARS TO BE STIFFENING VORSTER
SUPPORT FOR HIM. IT IS IMPORTANT TO
KEEP IN MIND HOWEVER THAT THOUGH ZIPA MAY BE WEAK WHEN
PITTED AGAINST RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES, TRIBAL DIFFERENCES
WITHIN RHODESIA BETWEEN THE MATABELE AND SHONA COULD BE
INCITED TO BLOODSHED RELATIVELY EASILY BY THE PF. THE
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THREAT TO DISRUPT A REFERENDUM IS THEREFORE A REAL ONE. LOW

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